Each year around the Lunar New Year, the U.S. Department of Defense updates its list of “Chinese Military Companies” under Section 1260H. In 2026, that routine process turned into a market‑moving spectacle.
Twice in a single week in February 2026, the Pentagon published—and then abruptly withdrew—a proposed expansion of the list. The document briefly named major Chinese companies, including leading technology, electric vehicle and biotechnology firms, before disappearing without explanation. Markets swung sharply. Screenshots spread across social media. Rumors filled the vacuum.
Was it a bureaucratic error? Interagency disagreement? Political intervention from the White House? The government has offered no public clarification.
But the episode matters for reasons far beyond procedural confusion. It exposed a deeper truth that Chinese companies—and increasingly, all global firms operating in the United States—can no longer afford to ignore: Geopolitics is now inseparable from commercial strategy.
The End of “Purely Commercial” Globalization
Even in its aborted form, the 2026 version of the 1260H list was more aggressive than its predecessors. Its scope suggested that scale, market leadership or international reputation no longer provide insulation from the U.S. national security scrutiny. Companies long seen as commercial success stories suddenly found themselves framed through a strategic competitive lens.
For years, many Chinese firms followed a straightforward globalization playbook: build better products, offer competitive prices, expand overseas and let commercial logic do the rest. That era has ended.
Today, a company’s ability to manage political risk—particularly in Washington—is becoming as important as its technology or execution. Market access increasingly hinges not just on what a company sells, but on how convincingly it can explain who it serves, where it invests and whose interests it advances.
Transactional Politics Cuts Both Ways
Ironically, the evolving posture of U.S.–China relations may present opportunity alongside risk.
Under the Biden administration, bilateral tensions were framed largely in ideological terms. The return of a more transactional foreign policy approach under President Trump’s second term alters that equation. In a system driven more by dealmaking than doctrine, flexibility—and leverage—matter.
Nowadays, geopolitical exposure is no longer simply a defensive challenge to be minimized. In a more transactional global policy environment, it’s also something that can be understood, priced and—at times—negotiated. Companies that understand this dynamic will be better positioned to adapt in the era of “Trump 2.0.”
Rethinking Market Entry
One clear lesson is that the traditional model of “made in China, sold in America” is politically fragile. Some firms have responded by investing locally—building facilities, hiring American labor and embedding themselves in U.S. communities.
Political exposure is no longer a secondary risk; it’s a core variable. Whether a company acknowledges that or not doesn’t change the reality. Companies entering sensitive sectors must think more creatively about market access. Where greenfield investment faces resistance, joint ventures with established U.S. partners may offer an alternative path—mitigating risk while building commercial allies and political capital at both the federal and state levels.
The Government Relations Gap
Yet many Chinese companies still treat government relations or corporate affairs as peripheral functions. In Washington, that is a costly miscalculation. Effective engagement requires preparation, credibility and sustained advocacy, not only reactive crisis management
The chaotic rollout of the 2026 Section 1260H list was not just a policy mishap. It was a signal. Commercial success in today’s global economy is conditioned on political competence. Companies that localize early, build real partnerships and engage in policy and public affairs are playing a different game from those that wait and react.
Globalization isn’t over—but the rules are different. The winners will be those who know how to operate at the intersection of business and politics—and who treat geopolitical risk not as a compliance issue, but as a core strategic capability.
Chinese Translation:
当地缘政治因素合并入资产负债表
赵莹
每年中国春节的前后，美国国防部都会“措手不及”地送中国公司一份大礼，即更新国防部的年度“中国军事企业”清单（Section 1260H 清单），今年清单的两度快速上线又撤回的“乌龙事件”，引发了市场剧烈波动和各种坊间传言。
2026年2月，五角大楼在短短一周内两次发布、又迅速撤回了这份拟扩大“清单”。文件曾短暂点名多家中国大型企业，其中包括行业内领先的科技公司、电动车和生物科技等公司，但随后在未作任何解释的情况下撤回了发布。市场随之剧烈波动，清单的截图在社交媒体上迅速传播，各种猜测和传言充斥其间。
这是一次行政失误？白宫各部门之间的分歧导致？还是总统层面的政治干预？截至目前，官方没有给出任何公开解释。
但这一事件的重要性远不止程序混乱本身。它揭示了一个更为深层的现实：无论是中国企业，还是所有在美国运营的全球企业，都已无法再回避一个事实——地缘政治，正在成为商业战略不可分割的一部分。
“纯商业化”全球化的终结
即便最终未能落地，2026年版的1260H清单在激进程度上也明显超过了以往。其覆盖范围释放出一个清晰信号：企业规模、市场领导地位或国际声誉，已不足以为企业提供免于美国国家安全审查的“护城河”。一些长期被视为商业成功典范的公司，骤然被置于战略竞争的审视框架之下。
多年来，许多中国企业遵循的是一套相对清晰的全球化路径：做出更好的产品、提供更具竞争力的价格、拓展海外市场，让商业逻辑自然奏效。然而不幸的事，这一时代已然结束。
今天，一家公司管理政治风险的能力——尤其是在华盛顿的政治风险管理——正变得与技术实力和执行能力同等重要。市场准入越来越不只是取决于企业“卖什么”，而在于它能否令人信服地解释清楚：它服务哪些客户、商业投资集中在哪里、代表了谁的利益。
交易型政治可能是一把“双刃剑”的避坑指南
耐人寻味的是，美中关系的演变并非只有风险，也可能孕育着机遇。
在拜登政府时期，双边紧张更多被置于意识形态对抗的框架之下。而在特朗普开启第二个任期后，更具交易性的外交政策取向正在改变这一逻辑。在一个由交易而非教条驱动的体系中，灵活性和博弈空间变得尤为重要。
在这样的背景下，地缘政治风险已不再只是需要防御和规避的负担。在一个更加“交易化”的全球政策环境中，政治风险可以被理解、被定价，甚至在某些情形下被商业谈判主导。能够洞察并运用这一逻辑的公司，将更有可能在“特朗普2.0时代”中实现生存和发展。
重新思考市场进入路径
一个显而易见的教训是，传统的“中国制造，美国销售”的模式，在政治层面已显得异常脆弱。对此，部分企业选择加大本地投入——在美国建厂、雇佣本地员工、深度融入社区。
政治方面的考量已不再是次要变量，而是核心风险。无论企业是否愿意正视，这一现实都客观存在。对于涉足敏感行业的公司而言，中企进入美国市场的方式必须更加富有创意。当绿地投资面临阻力时，与成熟的美国企业建立合资关系，可能成为一条替代路径，它能在降低政治风险的同时，积累商业盟友与联邦及州层面的政治资本。
政府关系的“短板”
然而，不少中国企业仍然将政府关系或公共事务视为边缘职能。在美国华盛顿，这种认知所导致的代价将十分高昂。有效的政府沟通需要的是前期准备、长期信誉构建和持续倡议，而不仅仅是在危机爆发后的被动应对。
2026年1260H清单的混乱出台，并不仅仅是一场政策失误，它本质上是一种信号：在当今的全球经济中，商业成功的前提是政治能力。那些尽早推进本地化、建立真实合作关系、并主动参与政策与公共事务的公司，正在参与一场完全不同的竞争；而等待、观望、被动反应的企业，则处于劣势。
全球化并未终结，但规则已经改变。最终胜出的，将是那些能够在商业与政治交汇处自如运作、并将地缘政治风险视为核心战略能力而非合规负担的公司。
